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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the widespread use of confidential
witnesses (“CWs”) in securities class action litigation1 following the
* © 2018 Gideon Mark.
** Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Maryland Robert H. Smith
School of Business; gmark@rhsmith.umd.edu. Professor Mark holds degrees from
Brandeis University, Columbia University, Harvard University, New York University, and
the University of California.
1. Such litigation is both common and costly. During the period of January 1996 to
December 2017, approximately 244 securities class action cases were filed on average each
year, excluding so-called IPO laddering cases. STEFAN BOETTRICH & SVETLANA
STARYKH, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION: 2017 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 2 (2018), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera
/publications/2018/PUB_Year_End_Trends_Report_0118_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLJ5
-XZS2]. “The total value of settlements approved by courts [in securities class action
cases] in 2016 was more than $5.9 billion, almost double the amount approved in 2015.”
LAARNI T. BULAN, ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2016 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 3 (2017),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2016
-Review-and-Analysis [http://perma.cc/F67E-EDEL]. Securities class action litigation
continued at a robust pace in 2017. Plaintiffs filed a record 412 federal securities class
action cases in 2017. This number was 52% greater than in 2016 and more than double the
1997-2016 average. So-called “core” filings (those excluding merger and acquisition
claims) increased to 214, 15% more than in 2016. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2017 YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (2018),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2017-YIR
[https://perma.cc/JU56-3WSY].
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enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(“PSLRA”).2 CWs are current or former employees (or, less
frequently, customers or suppliers) of the defendant company who
provide information to plaintiffs for use in their class action
complaints,3 typically in an effort to bolster scienter4 or falsity5
allegations, or both.6 This information is furnished anonymously, in
the sense that the CWs are not identified by name in the pleadings.7
Anonymity is provided because the witnesses are fearful of retaliation
by the defendant companies against which they are providing
information.8 Federal courts have accepted this pleading practice in
2. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
3. In re BofI Holding Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC, 2016 WL
5390533, at *30–31 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2016) (“Confidential witnesses are typically current
or former employees, customers, or suppliers, who are fearful of retaliation if their
identities are disclosed.” (citing Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities
Litigation, 36 J. CORP. L. 551, 554–55 (2011))); Jeff G. Hammel & Elizabeth R. Marks,
Confidential Witnesses: Reliable Source or Imaginary Friend?, 45 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA)
(July
15,
2013),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document
/x6dbe5og000000 [http://perma.cc/R2CW-ANVT (staff-uploaded archive)] (explaining that
CWs are “usually former company employees anonymously providing information to
plaintiffs for use in their complaints”); Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities
Litigation, 36 J. CORP. L. 551, 554–55 (2011) (describing CWs as “current or former
employees, customers, or suppliers fearful of retaliation if their identities are disclosed”).
4. See, e.g., Cutler v. Kirchner, 696 Fed. App’x 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2017) (determining
that the plaintiff successfully used allegations attributed to CW to plead scienter against
multiple defendants); Robb v. Fitbit, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(“Here, statements by CW 1 and CW 2 are sufficient to establish scienter.”).
5. See, e.g., In re Stratasys Ltd. S’holder Sec. Litig., 864 F.3d 879, 883–84 (8th Cir.
2017) (showing that the plaintiffs sought to use CW statements only to establish falsity).
6. See, e.g., In re BofI Holding, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC, 2017
WL 2257980, at *7–13 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2017) (concluding that information provided by
CWs helped establish both falsity and scienter).
7. See Robert L. Hickok & James H. S. Levine, Confidential Witness Statements PostTellabs, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (June 29, 2010), http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications
/confidential-witness-statements-post-tellabs-2010-06-29/ [http://perma.cc/L9LB-RCBC]
(discussing the prevalent use of statements from confidential sources in pleadings and
explaining such statements are only secured “by ensuring their anonymity”).
8. See, e.g., id. (observing that the only way to secure the testimony of current or
former employees concerned about retaliation by defendants is to ensure their
anonymity). “Retaliation can take many different forms . . . including: being fired, socially
ostracized, intimidated, demoralized, humiliated, demoted, or blacklisted; being denied a
promotion, overtime, or benefits; and/or being formally disciplined, reassigned, or given a
reduction in wages or hours.” Gideon Mark, Recanting Confidential Witnesses in Securities
Litigation, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 575, 596–97 (2014). The risk of retaliation confronts both
current and former whistleblowing employees. See Joel H. Bernstein & Eric D. Gottlieb,
Developments in Securities Class Actions—Confidential Witnesses: Increasing Judicial
Scrutiny, Discovery, and Millennial Media 2–3 (Mar. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with North Carolina Law Review) (“Former employees, such as the vast majority of
CWs, also can face retaliation.”); Jed S. Rakoff, Confidential Informants and Securities
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recognition of the risk of retaliation.9 While there is some variation
between the federal circuits, generally the use of CWs to establish
scienter is permissible so long as: (1) the witnesses are described with
sufficient particularity to establish their reliability and personal
knowledge, and (2) the statements attributed to them are indicative of
scienter.10 The required descriptions often ease the task for
defendants to ascertain the witnesses’ identities.11
While federal courts have accepted the use of confidential
witnesses in securities litigation, that acceptance has been begrudging.
Indeed, the Fifth12 and Seventh13 Circuits steeply discount (but do not
Class Actions: Mixed Messages and Motives, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 572–73 (2014)
(observing that the risk of retaliation against CWs “is a genuine problem, even for former
employees,” but adding that former employees have “a strong motive to gripe, and to
exaggerate”). The risk of retaliation is substantial. “One study found that 82% of the
whistleblowing population had been fired, quit their job under duress, or had significantly
altered responsibilities, as a result of their whistleblowing activities.” See Mark, supra, at
597. “Other surveys have found that up to two-thirds of whistleblowers lose their jobs and
due to blacklisting, most never work in their fields of expertise again.” Id.
9. See, e.g., In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 30 (1st Cir. 2002) (observing that
requiring plaintiffs to name their confidential internal corporate sources would have a
chilling effect on employees who provide “information about corporate malfeasance”
(citing Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000))); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300,
314 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Imposing a general requirement of disclosure of confidential sources .
. . [in complaints] could deter informants from providing critical information to
investigators in meritorious cases or invite retaliation against them.”).
10. See, e.g., In re Quality Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 865 F.3d 1130, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2017);
Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 995 (9th Cir. 2009); Novak, 216 F.3d
at 314 (“[A] complaint can meet the new pleading requirement imposed by paragraph
(b)(1) by providing . . . a sufficient general description of the personal sources of the
plaintiffs’ beliefs.”). Plaintiffs in securities class action litigation often struggle when using
CWs to establish scienter. See, e.g., In re Biogen Inc. Sec. Litig., 857 F.3d 34, 42–43 (1st
Cir. 2017) (holding that CW statements fail to “give rise to strong inference of scienter”);
In re Lifelock, Inc., Sec. Litig., 690 F. App’x 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding that CW
statements “fail to create an inference of scienter more cogent or compelling than an
alternative innocent inference” (quoting Zucco, 552 F.3d at 999–1000)); Hong v. Extreme
Networks, Inc., No. 15-cv-04883-BLF, 2017 WL 1508991, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2017)
(holding that statements of three CWs fail to establish scienter); Fadia v. FireEye, Inc.,
No. 5:14-cv-05204-EJD, 2016 WL 6679806, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2016) (“Upon
review, however, it is clear that the CW statements fail to establish a strong inference of
scienter.”).
11. See Leigh Handelman Smollar, The Struggle Over the Use of Confidential
Witnesses, POMERANTZ MONITOR (Pomerantz LLP, New York, N.Y.), May–June 2014, at
4,
http://pomerantzlawfirm.com/assets/monitor/0506-2014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/FRF4VHM7] (“Because the [PSLRA] requires plaintiffs to plead the details of the CW’s
position and ability to know the facts alleged, the defendants often can figure out who the
CWs are.”).
12. See, e.g., Ind. Elec. Workers’ Pension Tr. Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d
527, 535 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[C]ourts must discount allegations from confidential sources.”
(citing Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 756–57 (7th Cir. 2007))); Izadjoo v.
Helix Energy Sols. Grp., Inc., 237 F. Supp. 3d 492, 510 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (“Even when a
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automatically reject) allegations from CWs. Beyond discounting, the
use of CWs has raised a host of thorny legal issues. This Article
considers three of those issues, all of which relate to the pre-filing
interviews of CWs conducted by plaintiffs’ counsel and/or
investigators. The three issues are: (1) the use by defendants of
confidentiality, separation, and severance agreements to discourage
or bar interviews of employees or former employees by plaintiffs’
counsel or investigators; (2) interview practices that give rise to
alleged recanting by CWs; and (3) efforts by defendants to obtain
notes of witness interviews conducted by plaintiffs’ counsel or
investigators.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENTIAL WITNESSES IN SECURITIES
LITIGATION
Before addressing the three key legal issues identified, this
Article first considers the critical role played by CWs in securities
litigation. Two specific aspects of the PSLRA have sparked the
ubiquitous use of CWs in securities litigation. The first is the statute’s
creation of an elevated bar for pleading securities fraud.14 The
PSLRA amended the Securities Exchange Act15 to impose two strict
pleading requirements, both of which must be satisfied in order for a
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. A private securities
complaint involving an allegedly false or misleading statement must
“specify each statement alleged to be misleading, the reason(s) why
complaint sets out this type of information, the Fifth Circuit has applied Tellabs to require
district courts to ‘discount allegations from confidential sources’ because these ‘sources
afford no basis for drawing plausible competing inferences.’” (quoting Shaw Grp., 537
F.3d at 535)).
13. See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (“It
is hard to see how information from anonymous sources could be deemed ‘compelling’ . . .
. Perhaps these confidential sources have axes to grind. Perhaps they are lying. Perhaps
they don’t even exist.”); see also Doshi v. Gen. Cable Corp., 823 F.3d 1032, 1037 n.2 (6th
Cir. 2016) (“[C]ourts often discount information provided by anonymous sources.” (citing
Higginbotham, 495 F.3d at 756–57)); Shoemaker v. Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., No. 16-568
(DWF/KMM), 2017 WL 1180444, at *8 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2017) (noting that courts
routinely disregard the statements of CWs when deciding motions to dismiss);
Vallabhaneni v. Endocyte, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01048-TWP-MJD, 2016 WL 51260, at *15–16
(S.D. Ind. Jan. 4, 2016) (“The Seventh Circuit has reacted strongly against reliance on
confidential witnesses in securities fraud cases, noting that allegations from such witnesses
are to be steeply discounted.” (citing Higginbotham, 495 F.3d at 757)). But cf. Leigh
Handelman Smollar, The Importance of Conducting Thorough Investigations of
Confidential Witnesses in Securities Fraud Litigation, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 503, 510 (2015)
(“It appears that most courts, including the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, have
abandoned the ‘heavily discounted’ language of Higginbotham.”).
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2012).
15. §§ 78a–78qq.
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the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation . . . is made on
information and belief, . . . all facts on which that belief is formed.”16
In addition, the complaint must, with respect to each act or omission
alleged to violate the securities laws, state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the particular defendant acted
with the requisite scienter,17 which the Supreme Court has defined as
“a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud.”18
The second relevant change mandated by the PSLRA is the
imposition of an automatic stay of all discovery and other proceedings
during the pendency of a motion to dismiss,19 absent application of
one or two statutory exceptions. The two exceptions are when
particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to
prevent undue prejudice to the party seeking relief.20 Congress
created the stay to prevent plaintiffs from commencing securities
litigation (1) with the intent to use the discovery process to coerce
settlements and (2) as a vehicle to conduct discovery in the hope of
finding a sustainable claim.21 Federal courts have taken a broad view
of both the application of the PSLRA discovery stay and the time
when the stay comes into effect.22 If a motion to dismiss by any
defendant is pending, discovery is stayed for the entire case, even if
some of the claims are asserted under state law.23 The stay
16. § 78u-4(b)(1).
17. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).
18. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
19. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). Pre-PSLRA, “defendants in federal securities cases were
required to participate in discovery during the pendency of motions to dismiss.” Gideon
Mark, Federal Discovery Stays, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 405, 433–34 (2012).
“Defendants could avoid discovery only by moving for a protective order, requesting a
stay, and showing good cause under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 26(c). Such
motions were typically denied.” Id. at 434 (footnote omitted). Post-PSLRA, discovery is
automatically stayed. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (“In any private action arising under this chapter,
all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to
dismiss, unless the court finds upon motion of any party that particularized discovery is
necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party.”).
20. See §§ 77z-1(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
21. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 475–76 (2013)
(citing H.R. REP. 104-369 (1995)) (explaining that private securities fraud litigation has
been subject to abuse, including the extraction of extortionate settlements of frivolous
claims); In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002) (observing that
PSLRA discovery stay was intended by Congress to prevent defendants from having to
pay nuisance settlements in securities fraud actions).
22. 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2046.2, at 294–95 (3d ed. 2010).
23. See, e.g., City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys. v. Armstrong, No. 16-17-RGA,
2016 WL 880503, at *1 (D. Del. Mar. 1, 2016) (mem.) (first citing Winer Family Tr. v.
Queen, No. 03-4318, 2004 WL 350181, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2004) (mem.); then citing
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encompasses discovery during the pendency of motions to dismiss
amended complaints24 and motions for reconsideration of orders on
motions to dismiss,25 and it is of great practical significance. The
parties in securities class action cases rarely file motions for summary
judgment26 and less than one percent of such cases proceed to trial.27
Consequently, the ultimate outcome of the litigation is substantially
dependent on the resolution of motions to dismiss. If plaintiffs survive
the motion, “their chances of a major settlement increase
exponentially.”28 Not surprisingly, then, a motion to dismiss was filed
in ninety-four percent of all securities class actions commenced and
resolved during the period January 2000 to December 2017.29 Original
complaints are often amended multiple times in securities litigation,
typically in response to motions to dismiss, and therefore many
months or even years can pass before discovery begins.30 This is the
Spina v. Refrigeration, Serv. & Eng’g, Inc., No. 14-4230, 2014 WL 4996200, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 7, 2014) (mem.)) (explaining that the automatic stay on discovery under the PSLRA
is “applicable even though some of the claims are asserted under state law”).
24. See, e.g., In re Finisar Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 5:11-cv-01252-EJD, 2017 WL 1549485,
at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2017) (recognizing discovery stay pursuant to a motion to dismiss
an amended complaint under PSLRA, but ultimately denying plaintiff’s motion for
modification of stay as moot because motion to dismiss was denied).
25. See McGuire v. Dendreon Corp., No. C07-800-MJP, 2009 WL 666863, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 11, 2009) (rejecting plaintiff’s contention that PSLRA’s discovery stay is
inapplicable to a motion for reconsideration); Powers v. Eichen, 961 F. Supp. 2d 233, 235–
36 (S.D. Cal. 1997); but cf. In re Leapfrog Enter., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 15-cv-00347-EMC,
2017 WL 3263114, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2017) (declining to reinstate discovery stay in
connection with filing of motion for leave to file motion for reconsideration).
26. “Motions for summary judgment were filed by defendants in 7.5%, and by
plaintiffs in only 2.2%, of the securities class actions filed and resolved [during the period
between January 2000 to December 2017].” BOETTRICH & STARYKH, supra note 1, at 18.
27. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2016 YEAR IN
REVIEW 13 (2017), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-ClassAction-Filings-2016-YIR [https://perma.cc/CA7V-9T6W] (reporting that during the period
from 1997 to 2015, less than one percent of securities class action cases reached a trial
verdict).
28. William S. Freeman & Catherine T. Zeng, The Trouble with ‘Confidential Witness’
Allegations, LAW360 (Feb. 3, 2012, 2:12 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/303826/thetrouble-with-confidential-witness-allegations [http://perma.cc/N4GJ-DUCQ]; see also
Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, The Supreme Court’s Impact on Securities Class
Actions: An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 850, 851 (2011) (“The
PSLRA makes the motion to dismiss the main event in securities fraud class actions.”).
29. BOETTRICH & STARYKH, supra note 1, at 19. With regard to those cases in which
the motion to dismiss was decided, the following outcomes were reached: granted (38%),
granted without prejudice (7%), partially granted and partially denied (30%), and denied
(25%). Id.
30. See, e.g., Pension Tr. Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. Kohl’s Corp., 266 F. Supp. 3d
1154, 1157 (E.D. Wis. 2017) (noting that second motion to dismiss amended securities
fraud complaint was pending for nearly two years when case was reassigned to new judge);
City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-cv-5162, 2015 WL
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typical pattern because plaintiffs generally fail to have the PSLRA’s
automatic stay lifted under either the first or second statutory
exceptions, which, respectively, permit lifting when particularized
discovery is necessary to preserve evidence31 or to prevent undue
prejudice to the party seeking relief.32
The combination of the PSLRA’s strict pleading requirements
and discovery stay explains the CW phenomenon.33 Plaintiffs must
plead their cases with particularity,34 but they are generally barred
from obtaining discovery to bolster their showing of scienter and
other allegations until after all motions to dismiss have been
11120408, at *1 (W.D. Ark. June 18, 2015) (“Thus, this lawsuit has been pending more
than three years, during which time Plaintiff has been precluded from conducting
discovery.”); In re SemGroup Energy Partners, L.P. Sec. Litig., No. 08-MD-1989-GFKFHM, 2010 WL 5376262, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 21, 2010) (“Thus, this lawsuit has been
pending more than two years, during which time plaintiffs have been almost completely
precluded from conducting discovery.”).
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(1) (2012); In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports
Sec. Litig., No. 02 MDL 1484(MP), 01 CV 6881(MP), 2004 WL 305601, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 18, 2004) (refusing to lift stay because defendants avowed they had taken all
necessary steps to preserve all potentially relevant electronic evidence).
32. See § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). A number of courts interpreting the PSLRA have defined
undue prejudice as “improper or unfair treatment amounting to something less than
irreparable harm.” See, e.g., Desmarais v. First Niagara Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 15-1226-LPSCJB, 2016 WL 768257, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2016) (quoting Lusk v. Life Time Fitness,
Inc., No. 15-1911 (JRT/JJK), 2015 WL 2374205, at *2 (D. Minn. May 18, 2015)); Dipple v.
Odell, 870 F. Supp. 2d 386, 392 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Sarantakis v. Gruttadauria, No.
02 C 1609, 2002 WL 1803750, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2002)). The most commonly asserted
basis for a claim of undue prejudice is the existence of parallel litigation, or parallel
criminal or regulatory investigations, which require class action defendants to produce
documents to other plaintiffs, the government, or an investigating body. Courts usually
reject this argument. See, e.g., Mogensen v. Body Cent. Corp., No. 3:12-cv-954-J-20JRK,
2014 WL 12621615, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2014) (“The mere fact that documents have
been produced to government agencies in connection with a parallel investigation does not
support a showing of undue prejudice.”); Kuriakose v. Fed. Home Loan Mort. Co., 674 F.
Supp. 2d 483, 490 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2009) (refusing to lift stay where about 400,000
documents had been produced by lead defendant during active investigations conducted
by the SEC, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and a U.S. House of Representatives committee);
In re Schering-Plough Corp./Enhance Sec. Litig., No. 08-397 (DMC), 2009 WL 1470453, at
*1 (D.N.J. May 22, 2009) (denying plaintiff’s motion to modify stay to obtain documents
that were produced to government investigators and regulators).
33. See Union Asset Mgt. Holding AG v. SanDisk, LLC, 227 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1100
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (“The combined effect of the high scienter standard in securities fraud
litigation and the strict PSLRA discovery stay is to place great weight at the pleading stage
on the statements of confidential witnesses.”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs,
2009 WISC. L. REV. 507, 530 (noting that combination of PSLRA’s strict pleading
requirements and stay “puts a plaintiff in a vise: the pleading rules require particularized
allegations and a strong inference of scienter, while the discovery stay deprives the
attorney of the conventional means to develop this information”).
34. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (“[T]he complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which
that belief is formed”).
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resolved.35 The result has been almost universal reliance by plaintiffs
in securities class action complaints on information provided by
CWs.36 In the absence of publicly available information from the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) or
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) investigations, allegations based on
such information often are the only specific allegations in a complaint
supporting a claim of securities fraud.37 CWs, like other securities
fraud whistleblowers, thus function to advance the underlying
purposes of federal securities laws by protecting investors from
corporate misconduct and promoting the integrity of financial
markets.38 Indeed, significant evidence suggests that whistleblowers
are much more effective than either the SEC or external auditors in
uncovering fraud in public companies.39
The critical function of confidential witnesses in securities
litigation is analogous to the critical function served by the informants
that law enforcement agencies use to investigate criminal conduct. In
2015, it was reported that “federal law enforcement agencies [in the
35. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (“[A]ll discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during
the pendency of any motion to dismiss”).
36. See, e.g., In re BofI Holding, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC, 2016
WL 5390533, at *16 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2016) (“The Court is aware that confidential
witnesses have become a staple of securities litigation.”); Douglas H. Flaum & Israel
David, Disclosure of Confidential Witnesses in PSLRA Cases, N.Y. L.J., May 31, 2012, at 1
(“Of the various tools employed by plaintiffs’ counsel in securities cases, few are more
important than the use of confidential witnesses in complaints.”).
37. See Christopher Keller & Michael Stocker, Balancing the Scales: The Use of
Confidential Witnesses in Securities Class Actions, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 87, 88
(2009) (“[I]n the absence of publicly available information from SEC or Department of
Justice investigations, allegations based on information provided by confidential witnesses
offer the ‘best hope’ of plaintiffs surviving the PSLRA pleading standards.”) (quoting
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 16.101 (2d ed. 2006)); THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y.,
SEC. LITIG. COMM., SUBCOMM. ON USE OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES, DIALOGUE ON
THE CURRENT LAW AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM ON THE USE OF INFORMATION
FROM AND THE DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY OF INFORMANTS 3 (2009),
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071798-UseofConfidentialSources.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q7YW-KL53] (“Given the restrictions of the PSLRA, informants are
virtually the only means of obtaining non-public evidence of wrongdoing at a company
and are often essential for avoiding early dismissal of a meritorious action.”). The
foregoing report includes separate sections written by plaintiffs’ counsel and defense
counsel. The foregoing quotation is taken from the plaintiffs’ section.
38. Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Resolving the Continuing
Controversy Regarding Confidential Informants in Private Securities Fraud Litigation, 19
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 637, 666 (2010).
39. See, e.g., Christina Parajon Skinner, Whistleblowers and Financial Innovations, 94
N.C. L. REV. 861, 892 (2016) (“Congress has reported that in the past four years
whistleblowers have uncovered 54.1% of frauds in public companies, versus the 4.1%
detected by the SEC and external auditors.”).
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DOJ and Department of Homeland Security] used more than 16,000
confidential informants as part of investigations into criminal
activities and organizations.”40 Informants have been described by
former FBI Director William Webster as “the single most important
tool in law enforcement.”41 Many courts42 and commentators43 agree
that confidential informants are essential criminal justice tools. CWs
serve an analogous essential function in securities litigation.44 Not all
plaintiffs in securities class actions rely on information provided by
confidential witnesses,45 but their use is standard practice and it is
common for complaints or amended complaints in such litigation to
cite as many as twenty or more CWs.46 In short, confidential witnesses
are a primary feature of post-PSLRA securities class actions.
II. CONFIDENTIALITY, SEPARATION, AND SEVERANCE
AGREEMENTS
This Article next addresses companies’ use of confidentiality,
separation, and severance agreements to discourage or preclude
interviews of their employees or former employees by plaintiffs’
counsel or their investigators. These agreements often include terms
providing that the employee shall not disclose any confidential
company information to any third party and define confidential

40. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-15-807,
CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANTS: UPDATES TO POLICY AND ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WOULD IMPROVE
OVERSIGHT BY DOJ AND DHS AGENCIES 1 (2015).
41. See Ethan D. Wohl, Confidential Informants in Private Litigation: Balancing
Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 551, 554 (2007)
(quoting ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN THE
AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 158 (2002)).
42. See Keller & Stocker, supra note 37, at 88 (“Courts have long observed that the
U.S. system of criminal justice turns on the availability of confidential informants, and
have vigorously defended their use.”).
43. See, e.g., David Artman, Note, Who’s Behind Door Number One?: Problems with
Using Confidential Sources in Securities Litigation, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1827, 1834
(“Confidential informants are imperative for many investigations—espionage, police
work, and war are just a few examples.”).
44. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, supra note 8, at 572 (describing CWs as “confidential
informants”).
45. See, e.g., In re Iconix Brand Grp., Inc., No. 15 Civ. 4860 (PGG), 2017 WL 4898228,
at *18–19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2017) (noting absence from amended securities class action
complaint of any statements from CWs).
46. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Confidential Distortion: Dealing with Confidential
Witnesses in Securities Litigation, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 25, 2017),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/09/25/confidential-distortion-dealing-with-confidential
-witnesses-in-securities-litigation [http://perma.cc/F55S-Z8YZ]; see also Howard v.
Liquidity Servs. Inc., 322 F.R.D. 103, 110 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting that plaintiffs’ amended
complaint is based in part on information supplied by twenty CWs).
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information broadly to include any information the employee learned
during the course of his employment by the defendant company.47
The use of such agreements is common. A 2015 survey of more than
1,200 employees in the financial services industry in the United States
and United Kingdom found that nine percent of those surveyed in the
U.S. had signed or been asked to sign a confidentiality agreement that
would prohibit reporting illegal or unethical activities to law
enforcement or regulatory authorities.48 And “16 percent of those
surveyed reported their company’s confidentiality policies prohibit
the reporting of potential illegal or unethical activities.”49 This latter
figure rose to twenty-eight percent for those respondents earning
$500,000 or more per year.50
While the foregoing survey was directly concerned with
confidentiality agreements that bar reporting to law enforcement and
regulators, these same agreements—in combination with separation
and severance agreements—are used by companies to discourage or
bar disclosures of illegal conduct to plaintiffs’ counsel.51 As described
below, the judicial response to such agreements has been mixed, both
in securities litigation and other kinds of actions. The better response
is to treat the agreements in most cases as contrary to public policy
and limit them accordingly.
One of the earliest PSLRA-era cases to consider the legality of
confidentiality and severance agreements in the context of securities
litigation is In re JDS Uniphase Corporation Securities Litigation,52 in
47. Richard Moberly, Jordan A. Thomas & Jason Zuckerman, De Facto Gag Clauses:
The Legality of Employment Agreements That Undermine Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower
Provisions, 30 ABA J. LABOR & EMP. L. 87, 108 (2014).
48. See ANN TENBRUNSEL & JORDAN THOMAS, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME &
LABATON SUCHAROW LLP, THE STREET, THE BULL AND THE CRISIS: A SURVEY OF
THE
US
&
UK
FINANCIAL
SERVICES
INDUSTRY
7,
10
(2015),
https://www.secwhistlebloweradvocate.com/pdf/Labaton-2015-Survey-report_12.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SYR4-NXPR].
49. Id. at 7.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Joseph H. Einstein, Confidentiality Agreements Are Not a Bar to
Informal Witness Interviews, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: DISCOVERY, June 2009, at 1, 2 (“It is
not uncommon to find that witnesses otherwise willing to provide valuable information
may believe they are unable to do so because they are parties to confidentiality
agreements. Such agreements come in many forms, including non-disclosure agreements
aimed primarily at protecting trade secrets and business information; termination
agreements; or settlements of pending claims or litigations.”); Kathryn Hastings,
Comment, Keeping Whistleblowers Quiet: Addressing Employer Agreements to Discourage
Whistleblowing, 90 TUL. L. REV. 495, 524 (2015) (“[E]mployees who sign legally
unenforceable agreements may not be aware of the agreements’ unenforceability and will
refrain from whistleblowing in belief that the restrictions are legitimate.”).
52. 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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which the federal district court granted plaintiffs’ motion to limit the
scope of such agreements—primarily on public policy grounds.53 The
court supported its conclusion in part by noting federal public policy
in favor of whistleblowers in securities fraud cases,54 as expressed in
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s (SOX)55 provisions protecting
whistleblowers from retaliation.56 The court acknowledged that the
relevant SOX provision only applies to government or internal
investigations, but added that SOX “certainly does not establish a
public policy in favor of allowing employers to muzzle their
employees with overbroad confidentiality agreements.”57 Several
subsequent decisions have agreed with this fundamental conclusion
and refused to enforce confidentiality agreements in the context of
interviews with plaintiffs’ counsel or investigators in securities
litigation.58 Other decisions have been less favorable to plaintiffs.59
The reasoning of the court in JDS Uniphase is reinforced by the
whistleblower provisions of the later enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street
53. Id. at 1138.
54. Id. at 1136.
55. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). This section protects employees who report alleged
violations relating to mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, or any rule or
regulation of the SEC, or any provisions of federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders. § 1514A(a). This section also protects whistleblowing employees from, inter
alia, discharge, demotion, suspension, threats, and harassment. Id. The remedy available
to prevailing employees is compensatory damages, including reinstatement, back pay (with
interest), and compensation for special damages. § 1514A(c). It can include such noneconomic items as emotional distress and reputational harm. See, e.g., Halliburton, Inc. v.
Admin. Rev. Bd., 771 F.3d 254, 266 (5th Cir. 2014); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Admin.
Rev. Bd., 717 F.3d 1121, 1138–39 (10th Cir. 2013).
57. In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1136.
58. See, e.g., Brado v. Vocera Commc’ns, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1319 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (holding that confidentiality agreement did not bar plaintiff investors from using
information defendant’s former employee orally conveyed to plaintiffs’ lead counsel);
Takiguchi v. MRI Int’l, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-01183-JAD-VCF, 2013 WL 6528507, at *12 (D.
Nev. Dec. 11, 2013) (“[T]he court finds that the [confidentiality] agreement violates public
policy by prohibiting the discovery of possible violations of federal securities laws.”); see
also Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that
confidentiality agreements “inherently chill communications relevant to the litigation”).
59. See, e.g., Smilovits v. First Solar, Inc., No. CV-12-00555-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL
6574410, at *10–11 (D. Ariz. Dec. 17, 2012) (denying without prejudice plaintiffs’ motion
to limit confidentiality agreements, pending additional briefing and hearing); Kuriakose v.
Fed. Home Loan Mort. Co., 674 F. Supp. 2d 483, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying motion for
order declaring non-participation clause in severance agreement unenforceable, in part
because plaintiffs failed to present copy of the agreement); In re Spectrum Brands, Inc.
Sec. Litig., No. 1:05-cv-02494-WSD, 2007 WL 1483633, at *5–6 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (denying
motion for order limiting scope of confidentiality or severance agreements, in large part
because plaintiffs waited to file motion until after dismissal of amended complaint).
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Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”),60 which are
somewhat more robust than those set forth in SOX. In any SEC
enforcement action yielding $1 million or more in monetary
sanctions, Dodd-Frank requires the Commission to pay between ten
and thirty percent of the collected amount to one or more
whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original information to the
SEC that led to the successful enforcement of the action.61 DoddFrank also prohibits employers from discriminating against
whistleblowers in the terms and conditions of employment because
they have provided information to the SEC or have assisted the SEC
in an investigation or prosecution related to that information.62 This
provision is enforceable by the SEC,63 but Dodd-Frank also allows a
whistleblower who believes his employer has violated this provision
to sue in federal court for reinstatement, double back pay owed, and
fees and costs.64 Further, under Rule 21F-17, promulgated by the SEC
in August 2011, employers are prohibited from taking any action that
would “impede an individual from communicating directly with the
Commission staff about a possible securities law violation, including
enforcing or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement . . .
with respect to such communications.”65
By various metrics, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program has
been successful. By the close of the 2017 fiscal year, the program had
generated more than 22,000 tips and awarded approximately $160
million to 46 whistleblowers, and that information led to successful
SEC enforcement actions in which more than $975 million in financial
sanctions were ordered.66 But the SEC is not merely focused on using
tips to generate sanctions. Another priority of the Commission is the
60. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 22, 31,
and 42 U.S.C.).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1).
62. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(2) (2017).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17. The SEC broadly interprets Rule 21F-17. See Matthew T.
Martens, Arian M. June & Caroline Schmidt, Four Key Whistleblower Trends—And How
Companies Can Prepare for Them, 49 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 225, 228 (2016);
David M. Stuart & Kyle S. Gazis, The SEC as the Whistleblower Program’s Advocate:
Severance Agreements and FCPA Investigations, FCPA REP., Oct. 12, 2016, at 1, 3.
66. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1, 23 (2017); see also Amanda M. Rose,
Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower Program Changes the Securities
Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1235, 1281 (2014) (“All told, it seems
likely that the [program] will help to reduce the social harm caused by securities fraud
through enhanced deterrence.”).
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assessment of confidentiality, severance, and other kinds of
agreements that stifle whistleblowing.67 In 2015 the SEC brought its
first enforcement action against a company, KBR, Inc., for its use of
agreements that impeded whistleblowers in violation of Rule 21F17,68 and in subsequent years the SEC significantly stepped up its
enforcement efforts in this area. Between April 2015 and January
2017, the SEC issued nine orders enforcing Rule 21F-17.69 The SEC
brought enforcement actions against KBR, Anheuser-Busch InBev
SA/NV, BlackRock, Inc., BlueLinx Holdings, Inc., Health Net, Inc.,
Homestreet Inc., Merrill Lynch, NeuStar, Inc., and SandRidge
Energy, Inc.70 Some of these companies used language in
contravention of Rule 21F-17 in hundreds of their agreements with
employees. NeuStar, Inc., for example, used impermissible nondisparagement clauses in at least 246 severance agreements during the
period August 2011 to May 2015,71 and more than 500 former
employees of SandRidge Energy, Inc. signed separation agreements
with impermissible restrictive language.72
The SEC continued to examine potential violations of Rule 21F17 in 2017, following the presidential election.73 But it is not the only
federal agency taking an aggressive approach. In September 2016, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”)—which
is charged with enforcing more than twenty federal whistleblowing

67. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 66, at 6, 19–21.
68. See KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74619, 2015 WL 1456619, at *2–3 (Apr.
1, 2015); see also Thomas W. White, SEC Enforcement Actions Under Exchange Act Rule
215-17, J. INV. COMPLIANCE, 2017, at 1, 2.
69. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 66, at 19–20.
70. See id. (discussing SEC actions against HomeStreet, NeuStar, BlackRock, and
SandRidge); SEC Announces Two Enforcement Actions Regarding Restrictive Language in
Severance Agreements, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP (Dec. 22, 2016),
https://www.davispolk.com/publications/sec-announces-two-enforcement-actions-regarding
-restrictive-language-severance/ [https://perma.cc/5QSV-W899] (discussing NeuStar and
SandRidge enforcement actions); Jay Sherwin, Whistleblower Protections Trump
Confidentiality Provisions: SEC Enforcement of Rule 21F-17, WOODRUFF SAWYER & CO.
(July 26, 2017), https://wsandco.com/do-notebook/whistleblower-protections-sec-rule-21f17/ [https://perma.cc/K4UG-QFDS] (identifying nine enforcement actions).
71. See NeuStar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79593, 2016 WL 7335658, at *3
(Dec. 19, 2016).
72. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 66, at 21.
73. See Carmen Germaine, SEC Whistleblower Program is Business as Usual, Chief
Says, LAW360 (June 28, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/939700/sec-whistleblowerprogram-is-business-as-usual-chief-says [https://perma.cc/HP3A-PMM2] (reporting that
SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower continues to examine severance and other employment
agreements to ensure that employees are not prevented from reporting securities law
violations to SEC).
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laws74—issued new policy guidelines for its review of private
settlement agreements presented to OSHA for approval in
whistleblowing actions.75 These guidelines largely mirror the SEC’s
perspective on confidentiality and severance agreements that impede
whistleblowing.76 In May 2017, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”) amended its whistleblower rules77 to more
closely align them with the SEC’s program.78 The CFTC’s
amendments prohibit the enforcement or threatened enforcement of
any confidentiality agreement or pre-dispute arbitration provisions in
pre-employment, employment, or post-employment agreements that
might impede an individual from communicating a possible violation
of the Commodity Exchange Act79 to the CFTC.80 The National
Labor Relations Board and Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission have similarly attacked confidentiality, separation, and
release agreements that potentially discourage whistleblowing.81
The SEC has been aggressive even absent evidence that
companies have taken action to enforce the subject contract
provisions or prevent employees from communicating with the
74. Locke Lord LLP, OSHA Joins SEC in Scrutinizing Separation and Settlement
Agreements, JD SUPRA (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/osha-joins-secin-scrutinizing-10559/ [https://perma.cc/8BCR-4WLC].
75. MARYANN GARRAHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMIN., NEW POLICY GUIDELINES FOR APPROVING SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS IN WHISTLEBLOWER CASES 1 (2016).
76. See Sarah E. Bouchard & Thomas A Linthorst, OSHA Increases Scrutiny of
Whistleblower Settlement Agreements, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP (Sept. 26, 2016),
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/osha-increases-scrutiny-of-whistleblower-settlementagreements [http://perma.cc/E7BT-8RFW (dark archive)] (“The catalyst for these changes
is the perceived use of overbroad confidentiality or nondisparagement clauses.”). Ed Ellis,
Chip Jones & Kevin Griffith, OSHA Joins the SEC in Attacking Confidentiality and Other
Provisions in Private Settlement Agreements, LITTLER MENDELSON P.C. (Sept. 19, 2016),
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/osha-joins-sec-attacking-confidentialityand-other-provisions-private [https://perma.cc/M5CW-62ED] (“The OSHA guidelines
extend the approach recently adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.”).
77. See Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC
Strengthening Anti-Retaliation Protections for Whistleblowers and Enhancing the Award
Claims Review Process (May 22, 2017), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom
/documents/file/wbruleamend_factsheet052217.pdf [http://perma.cc/8KRJ-S42S].
78. See Lewis Csedrik, et al., Inside the CFTC’s Enhanced Whistleblower Protections,
LAW360 (June 9, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/932700/inside-the-cftc-senhanced-whistleblower-protections [https://perma.cc/U2ML-9EA5].
79. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27 (2012).
80. See Csedrik, et al., supra note 78.
81. See Rachel B. Cowen & Deborah R. Meshulam, Redux—Federal Agencies Attack
Employment Agreements, and What You Can Do About It: 8 Steps to Consider, DLA
PIPER (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/04
/federal-agencies-attack-agreements/ [http://perma.cc/7BQU-7EWX].
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government. This was true, for example, with respect to the SEC’s
enforcement actions against KBR, Health Net, and BlueLinx.82 The
SEC has taken action because the mere existence of the clauses in
severance and confidentiality agreements has a chilling effect on
whistleblowing. Rule 21F-17 unambiguously provides that the mere
existence of overly restrictive contract language can result in a
violation.83
The SEC’s recognition of the importance of preventing the
chilling effect of overbroad confidentiality, separation, and severance
agreements should help guide courts confronted with such
agreements in private securities litigation. Courts should refuse to
enforce agreements that restrict the ability of current or former
employees to participate in pre- or even post-filing interviews with
plaintiffs’ investigators or counsel. A common refusal to enforce can
reduce the chilling effect of these agreements.84 Of course, courts
should establish appropriate limits by upholding protection for trade
secrets and highly sensitive customer information and by restricting
use of the unprotected information employees provide to the pending
litigation. Such restrictions are vital, but their use should be the
exception rather than the norm. A recent securities class action in
California provides a good example of the infrequent situation where
restrictions are appropriate.85 The federal district court enforced
confidentiality agreements in that case and required the return to
defendant of 150 pages of highly sensitive customer information,
including the names, addresses, telephone numbers, social security
numbers, account balances, and tax forms provided to plaintiff by the
former employee of defendant.86 This information merited
protection.87
82. See Recent Whistleblower Actions by SEC and Congress Add Risk to Severance
Agreements, PERKINS COIE LLP (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/newsinsights/recent-whistleblower-protection-actions-by-the-sec-and-congress.html [http://perma.cc
/G3GX-V2RQ].
83. See SEC Brings Additional Enforcement Actions Against Companies with
Employment Agreements that Impede Whistleblowing, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Aug. 22,
2016), http://www.sidley.com/news/sec-brings-actions-to-enforce-whistleblower [https://perma.cc
/FG38-C7Q8] (“It is important to note that the mere existence of improperly restrictive
language can lead to a Rule 21F-17 violation.”).
84. See Moberly et al., supra note 47, at 89 (“Th[e] use of a confidentiality agreement
not only punishes an employee after the whistle is blown, but also chills the willingness of
employees to blow the whistle in the future due to the fear of being sued by a current or
former employer.”).
85. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys. v. BofI Holding, Inc., No. 15cv2324 GPC (KSC),
2017 WL 1102732, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2017).
86. Id. at *5.
87. Id.
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In summary, companies have used confidentiality, separation,
and severance agreements to discourage or preclude plaintiffs’
counsel and/or their investigators from interviewing companies’
employees or former employees during securities litigation. Courts
should treat these agreements in most cases as contrary to public
policy and limit them accordingly. Such treatment would be
consistent with the SEC’s enforcement of Rule 21F-17 and the
similarly aggressive approach taken by other federal agencies.
III. RECANTING WITNESSES
This Article next addresses the problem of recanting confidential
witnesses. As noted supra, the PSLRA imposes an automatic stay of
discovery while motions to dismiss are pending.88 When the motions
to dismiss are denied, the stay is lifted.89 In most cases defendants
then seek discovery of plaintiffs’ confidential witnesses, primarily to
test whether the witnesses will confirm the information attributed to
them in plaintiffs’ complaint.90 The clear trend is for federal district
courts to permit such discovery, over objections that it is contrary to
public policy91 and undermines work product protection.92 When
discovery of CWs is taken, the opportunity arises for the witnesses to
recant, deny, or modify some or all of the information attributed to
them by plaintiffs. In a series of recent high-profile securities fraud

88. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., In re Finisar Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 5:11-cv-01252-EJD, 2017 WL 1549485,
at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2017).
90. See Carl H. Loewenson, Jr. & James J. Beha II, Reliability of Confidential
Witnesses in Securities Fraud Complaints, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 30, 2013),
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/130930-reliability-confidential-witnesses-securities-fraudcomplaints.pdf [http://perma.cc/SM3J-VVE8] (“Once a case proceeds to discovery,
however, defendants are typically able to learn the identities of confidential witnesses and
probe the accuracy of their statements.”).
91. Flaum & David, supra note 36, at 2 (“Most courts, however, have found that the
names of confidential witnesses can be disclosed despite any public policy concerns.”).
92. See, e.g., Fort Worth Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 09 Civ.
3701(JPO)(JCF), 2013 WL 1896934, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2013) (mem.) (noting that in
the Southern District of New York, “the majority view, especially more recently,” is that
the names of CWs are not entitled to work product protection); Flaum & David, supra
note 36, at 1 (“[T]he number of cases in which plaintiffs have managed to withhold the
names of confidential witnesses on work product grounds is comparatively slim and
relatively dated.”); Jennifer H. Rearden & Darcy C. Harris, Growing Trend Favors
Disclosure of Witnesses’ Identities, SEC. LITIG., Fall 2012, at 11, 15 (“Although the case law
is still unsettled, the growing trend requiring plaintiffs to disclose in discovery the
identities of specific confidential witnesses referenced in their complaint seems
unmistakable.”).
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cases such recanting93 has occurred, or has been alleged to have
occurred.94 The new version of events can be used by defendants to
support a motion for summary judgment.
A. Coercion of Recanting Statements
While discovery of CWs can support motions for summary
judgment, evidence of recanting often becomes available in the form
of declarations or affidavits even before the discovery stay has been
lifted. As noted previously, the requirement that plaintiffs be specific
when pleading allegations about CWs often enables defendants to
learn the sources’ identities.95 Defendants frequently contact CWs
after making positive identifications96 and secure affidavits. In these
situations, defendants have sought to use the affidavits to support
motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“Federal Rules”),97 motions to strike under Rule 12(f),98
motions for reconsideration of denials of motions to dismiss,99 and/or
motions for sanctions under Rule 11.100
There is considerable dispute about the frequency of recanting
by CWs in securities fraud litigation. While some commentators and
defense counsel believe that recanting is common,101 and some courts
93. “Recanting” is sometimes characterized in criminal cases as an unequivocal
repudiation of prior testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Tobias, 863 F.2d 685, 689 (9th
Cir. 1988). In this Article, the term is used more broadly to also include denials that
purported statements were ever made, and modifications of prior statements.
94. See, e.g., In re Millennial Media, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14 Civ. 7923(PAE), 2015 WL
3443918, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015); City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co.,
306 F.R.D. 175, 182 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (mem.); City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing events in
which, allegedly, “several of the confidential witnesses . . . had ‘recanted’ statements
attributed to them . . . and/or had denied making such statements in the first place.”).
95. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
96. See Heather Speers, Confidential Witness Allegations in Securities Fraud
Litigation, CORP. COUNSEL, Winter 2017, at 6, 9 (“Defense counsel often attempt to
contact CWs to investigate allegations in the complaint.”).
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b); see, e.g., Union Asset Mgmt. Holding AG v. Sandisk LLC,
227 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1099–1100 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f); see, e.g., Hatamian v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 14cv-00226-YGR(JSC), 2016 WL 2606830, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2016).
99. See, e.g., In re Genworth Fin., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14 Civ. 2392 (AKH), 2016 WL
858679, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2016).
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See, e.g., In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F.
Supp. 2d 1299, 1309–10 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
101. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Dickey & Brian M. Lutz, The SEC’s Final Whistleblower
Rules: The Floodgates Open on a New Wave of Whistleblower Claims, as the SEC
Authorizes Massive Bounties to Anonymous Tipsters, SEC. LITIG. REP. (Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, New York, N.Y.), July/Aug. 2011, at 1, 6, https://www.gibsondunn.com/wpcontent/uploads/documents/publications/Dickey-Lutz-SECFinalWhistleblowerRules-
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share this belief,102 a review of recent cases suggests the true incidence
has been exaggerated. In a number of cases the declarations
submitted by allegedly recanting CWs reflected only immaterial
differences between the declarations and the material attributed to
them in plaintiffs’ complaints.103 Moreover, it seems likely that much

JulyAugust2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9C4-8YX4] (asserting that CWs “have shown
themselves to be far too easily coaxed by plaintiffs’ counsel or their private investigators to
misrepresent, exaggerate, or misstate the facts”); Alison Frankel, The Confidential Witness
Conundrum in Securities Class Actions, NAT’L LEGAL NEWS FROM REUTERS (Sept. 20,
2012),
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I0fcaf310037211e2bc49ffde052dcc84/View
/FullText.html (“[T]he truth is that just about every major securities class action firm has
seen witnesses say one thing to plaintiffs’ investigators and another to former employers
after their identity is revealed.”); Douglas W. Greene, How to Solve the Flawed
(Apr.
8,
2013),
Confidential
Witness
Issue,
LAW360
http://www.law360.com/articles/430766/how-to-solve-the-flawed-confidential-witness-issue
[http://perma.cc/S9DG-ZZWH] (referring to the “recurring and pervasive problem” of
flawed CW allegations, but noting that many cases involve only “garden-variety
inaccuracies”); Kevin LaCroix, The Confidential Witness Problem in Securities Litigation,
D&O DIARY (July 15, 2013), http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/07/articles/securitieslitigation/the-confidential-witness-problem-in-securities-litigation/ [http://perma.cc/4SNE4Y32] (“The pattern recurs often that after the dismissal motion is denied, and the
witnesses’ identities are known and their testimony is questioned, the witnesses recant.”).
102. See, e.g., In re Millennial Media, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14 Civ. 7923(PAE), 2015 WL
3443918, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015) (noting the “growing body of cases chronicling
the repudiation by CWs of statements attributed to them in securities class-action
complaints”).
103. See, e.g., In re Genworth Fin., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14 Civ. 2392 (AKH), 2016 WL
858679, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2016) (finding that deposition testimony and declaration of
two CWs were somewhat inconsistent with allegations attributed to them in complaint but
did not constitute recantations); City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (mem.) (“[T]he only statement
attributed to the CWs in the Amended Complaint that the Court found clearly inaccurate
was the result, not of any mis-reporting by [the CW], but of mis-drafting by counsel.”);
Minneapolis Firefighters’ Relief Ass’n v. Medtronic, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 454, 463–64 (D.
Minn. 2011) (mem.) (concluding that differences between the declarations of 13 CWs and
the allegations in plaintiffs’ amended complaint were “mostly innocuous”); Local 703, I.B.
of T. Grocery and Food Emps.’ Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp. No. CV 10-J-2847IPJ, 2011 WL 12627599, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2011) (mem.) (reviewing affidavits from
allegedly recanting CWs and the interview notes from plaintiffs’ investigator and
concluding that “nothing in the affidavit statements of the CWs contradict[s] the
statements in the Amended Complaint”); In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851
F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (finding that, with respect to five of six CWs, there
was no basis to conclude that the allegations attributed to them in the first amended
consolidated complaint lacked evidentiary support). In BankAtlantic the court reached a
different conclusion with respect to the sixth CW. The court found a Rule 11 violation
with respect to use by plaintiffs of this witness. In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, 851 F. Supp.
2d at 1321. Because the plaintiffs cited this CW as a source of information in only five
paragraphs of the 98-page first amended consolidated complaint, the violation was de
minimis, and defendants were awarded only the reasonable fees and expenses they
incurred in deposing that witness and one-tenth of the reasonable fees and expenses they
incurred in preparing their motion for sanctions. Id. at 1321–22.
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of the recanting that does occur is the product of coercion by
defendants and their counsel, and/or the fear of retaliation
experienced by confidential witnesses. Counsel for plaintiffs in
securities class actions assert that such recanting as a result of
pressure is quite common104 and some courts have found that
recanting was in fact the product of pressure. An example of such a
judicial finding is a case involving defendant Lockheed Martin
Corporation, wherein plaintiff argued that the recanting CWs had
changed their stories “because of financial and other pressures
Lockheed had brought to bear upon them once they had been
identified by name.”105 Judge Jed Rakoff’s careful post-settlement
opinion denying Lockheed’s motion for summary judgment suggests
that plaintiff was correct, at least in part. As the opinion notes, some
of the CWs “felt pressured into denying outright statements they had
actually made.”106 The opinion also notes that there was only one
statement attributed to the CWs in the amended complaint that was
clearly inaccurate, and that was the result of a drafting error by
counsel that was later corrected.107 This is a clear example of a
prominent federal judge accepting plaintiff’s argument that recanting
was the product of pressure exerted by defendant, at least in part.
It is frequently suggested that appropriate protective orders can
shield those CWs in securities litigation who are fearful about their
safety or security.108 But such orders do nothing to protect against the
risk of retaliation. They also do nothing to guard against the pressure
exerted by defense counsel who interrogate CWs during their
depositions about possible breaches of their confidentiality and/or
severance agreements.109 Under Rule 26(c)(1) of the Federal Rules, a
protective order must be premised on good cause,110 and courts
typically find that general statements regarding a serious risk of
retaliation do not satisfy the standard. Rather, plaintiffs are required
104. See, e.g., LaCroix, supra note 101 (citing unidentified leading plaintiffs’ lawyer for
proposition that “confidential witnesses always recant, because of the financial and other
pressure their employer can bring to bear on them, regardless of how precise, specific and
detailed their prior testimony had been”); Smollar, supra note 11, at 4 (“[F]ear of
retaliation by the former employer accounts for most of witness recantation.”).
105. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
106. Id. at 637.
107. Id. at 637–38.
108. See, e.g., Loewenson & Beha II, supra note 90.
109. See Frankel, supra note 101 (“[I]t’s one thing for [CWs] to talk to plaintiffs’
investigators. It’s another for them to stick by their allegations when their former
employers’ lawyers start grilling them in depositions about the confidentiality provisions in
their severance agreements.”).
110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
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to make a specific showing that disclosure will cause a clearly defined
and serious injury.111 Federal courts generally decline to find such
injury, especially where the CW is a former employee.112
B.

Best Practices to Minimize Recanting

There is no doubt that some share of recanting by CWs is
genuine, in the sense that (1) there are material differences between
what was attributed to the witness in the complaint and what he
subsequently testifies to, and (2) such differences are not the product
of coercion, pressure, or fear of retaliation.113 This share is unlikely to
111. See, e.g., In re Marsh & McLennan Cos. Sec. Litig., MDL No. 1744, No. 04 Cv.
8144(SWK), 2008 WL 2941215, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2008) (holding that claimed threat
of retaliation requires specific factual support); Brody v. Zix Corp., No. 3-04-CV-1931-K,
2007 WL 1544638, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2007) (holding that conclusory assertion of
consequences to CWs if their identities were revealed “does not come close to establishing
a genuine risk of retaliation”); Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco
Sys., No. C01-20418JW, 2005 WL 1459555, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2005) (“Plaintiffs
have not provided any evidence indicating that there is a real fear of retaliation from
Cisco.”); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV. A. MDL 1219, 1999 WL 354527, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. May 26, 1999) (denying request for protective order because plaintiffs failed to make
specific showing that defendant “has attempted to intimidate individuals connected with
this case or has a history of such intimidation in other cases”).
112. See, e.g., In re BofI Holding, Inc., Sec. Litig., 318 F.R.D. 129, 135 (S.D. Cal. 2016)
(“Lead Plaintiff’s argument that the confidential witnesses harbor a ‘legitimate fear of
retaliation’ is not supported by specific ‘reliable, non-conclusory’ evidence.”); Plumbers &
Pipefitters Local Union No. 630 Pension-Annuity Tr. Fund v. Arbitron, Inc., 278 F.R.D.
335, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting use of protective orders to guard against risk of
retribution by CWs’ current, future, or past employers); Flaum & David, supra note 36, at
2 (noting that courts are reluctant to find a realistic possibility of retaliation if the CWs are
no longer employed by the defendant). In In re BofI Holding, Inc., the federal district
judge found that defendants’ contacts with CWs “had and has the potential to . . . pressure
confidential witnesses to give untruthful statements.” 318 F.R.D. at 135. Nevertheless, he
held that the Rule 26(c) protective order issued by the magistrate judge was contrary to
law as overbroad. Id. at 133. The district judge issued a much narrower order. Id. at 135–
36.
113. One prominent example is City of Livonia Employees’ Retirement System v.
Boeing Co., 306 F.R.D. 175 (N.D. Ill. 2014). In that case the district court held, following
remand from the Seventh Circuit, that plaintiffs’ counsel failed to conduct a reasonable
pre-filing investigation, warranting Rule 11 sanctions. Id. at 183. The district court noted
that counsel filed the original complaint before interviewing their sole CW, who was
critical to the case. Id. at 180. Counsel filed the amended complaint and second amended
complaint after their investigator interviewed the CW, but they never personally
interviewed him and never attempted to verify the information he allegedly provided to
the investigator. Id. at 181. Moreover, the investigator noted in her report that some of the
information the CW provided was unreliable. Id. At his deposition following denial of
defendant Boeing’s motion to dismiss the CW recanted all of the material allegations
attributed to him in the second amended complaint. Id. at 177. Plaintiffs’ counsel met the
CW for the first time at this deposition. Id.; see also Laura J. O’Rourke, Baker McKenzie,
A Cautionary Tale Regarding the Use of ‘Confidential Witnesses’ in Pleadings, LEXOLOGY
(Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0fc50900-e8dd-44d5-
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be de minimis, and it continues to vex litigants, counsel, and judges.
Various solutions to the problem have been proposed, and they are
discussed below.
One major factor likely contributing to the recanting problem is
that plaintiffs’ counsel typically delegates to investigators the task of
interviewing confidential witnesses.114 From an ethical perspective,
there is nothing improper about such a delegation. Rule 11 imposes
an affirmative duty on an attorney signing any pleading or motion to
conduct an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances into whether
factual contentions have evidentiary support,115 and the PSLRA
requires counsel to conduct a more diligent pre-filing investigation in
cases involving securities fraud than in other cases116—in part because
“the mere filing of a broad, class action securities complaint is a
market relevant event for any reputable company.”117 Counsel’s nondelegable duty to investigate does not extend to personally gathering
the facts,118 but the use of investigators may multiply the risk of error.
Any witness, confidential or not, may speculate, recount hearsay, or
provide opinions, rather than facts, and an investigator may mistake a
witness’ conjecture for fact.119 Subsequently, when the investigator

a4b1-50a2fe99b83f [perma.cc/34HL-BRF2] (“[A] reasonable take-away from [Boeing] for
any counsel that may utilize investigators and confidential witnesses is that the ‘ostrich’
approach can be sanctionable, and that more is required.”).
114. See Charles Davidow et al., Best Practice for Dealing with Confidential Witness
Allegations in Securities Fraud Complaints: The Implications of In re Millennial Media and
Other Recent Decisions, 47 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) (July 27, 2015),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/XFNL9BD8000000 [https://perma.cc
/CH3Q-N3YZ (staff-uploaded archive)] (“The witness accounts are commonly collected
by hired investigators or junior personnel in the office of plaintiffs’ counsel.”); see also
Bolling v. Gold, No. C13-0872JLR, 2015 WL 6870617, at *6–7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2015)
(citing with approval cases criticizing failure of plaintiffs’ counsel in securities fraud
litigation to personally interview CWs or confirm accuracy of CWs’ purported statements
to investigators).
115. FED. R. CIV P. 11(b).
116. Auto. Ind. Pension Tr. Fund v. Textron Inc., 682 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2012)
(observing that PSLRA “leaves a plaintiff’s counsel with a greater than usual burden of
investigation before filing a securities fraud complaint”).
117. City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., 306 F.R.D. 175, 180 (N.D. Ill.
2014).
118. In re Millennial Media, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14 Civ. 7923(PAE), 2015 WL 3443918,
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015) (“To be clear, Rule 11’s command that counsel conduct
‘an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances’ does not require counsel personally to
participate in an initial witness interview. It is, of course, permissible and customary, not to
mention economical, for facts to be gathered first by investigators.”) (quoting In re
BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2011)).
119. Id. at *12 (“[T]he investigator may have mistaken hearsay, opinion, or conjecture
for facts, or the investigator’s interview memo may not have carefully distinguished
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transmits his interview notes or summary to plaintiffs’ counsel, this
may result in the drafting of complaints that fail to reflect the CWs’
factual, personal knowledge. Of course, counsel could just as easily as
their investigators improperly interpret, infer, and/or extrapolate,
based on information provided to them by a CW. But the risk of error
(and subsequent recanting) is likely magnified when only the
investigator conducts the witness interview.
What interview practices should plaintiffs’ counsel and their
investigators employ in order to minimize the risk of recanting? In In
re Millennial Media, Inc. Securities Litigation,120 one of the most
prominent cases involving CW recanting, Judge Paul Engelmayer
issued guidance in dicta, and most of it appears practical. First, when
plaintiffs’ investigator—rather than plaintiffs’ counsel—conducts the
CW interview, counsel should independently confirm the accuracy of
the investigator’s memorandum of the witness interview.121 This is
sensible, although not necessarily feasible. In many cases, plaintiffs
delegate the interview task to investigators because whistleblowing
witnesses are reluctant to speak with counsel,122 a particular CW is
less significant, or an attorney is unavailable. If a CW will speak freely
only with investigators in the pre-filing stage of the litigation, and that
CW is the only known source of the information attributed to him—
which he very often is123—then it is not always clear that confirmation
or corroboration can occur. This can be problematic for plaintiffs,
because some federal courts expressly require that information
attributed to a CW in a complaint be corroborated.124

between them.”). See generally Loewenson & Beha II, supra note 90 (emphasizing the
doubt cast on CW testimony by numerous courts).
120. No. 14 Civ. 7923(PAE), 2015 WL 3443918 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015).
121. Id. at *12. Accord Lopez v. Ctpartners Exec. Search, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 12, 31
n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
122. See Smollar, supra note 13, at 505 (“CWs often do not wish to be embroiled in any
kind of litigation or to talk to lawyers, especially when the discussion revolves around the
alleged fraud committed by their former employer while he or she was employed there.”).
123. Michael B. Eisenkraft, Dealing with Confidential Witness Recantation Statements,
(Jan.
23,
2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/883453/dealing-withLAW360
confidential-witness-recantation-statements [https://perma.cc/Y42E-J6YZ] (noting that in
the absence of discovery, CWs “are often the only sources of information as to what the
defendants knew and when they knew it”).
124. See, e.g., In re Daou Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005); In re
Huffy Corp. Sec. Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 968, 993 (S.D. Ohio 2008). Cf. Smollar, supra note
13, at 519–20 (“The key to avoiding sanctions is [for plaintiffs] to ensure that there is
corroborating evidence to the CW statements.”). But cf. Zaghian v. Farrell, 675 F. App’x.
718, 720 n.1 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2017) (noting that allegations attributed to CW were
sufficiently particular, without expressly requiring corroboration); John H. Henn, Brandon
F. White & Matthew C. Baltay, Anonymous Sources in Securities Class Action Complaints,
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Setting aside the foregoing concerns, how could this best practice
be enforced? One mechanism would be for a court to request a
certification by plaintiffs’ counsel that he or she has contacted each
CW and obtained confirmation from the witnesses of the essential
allegations attributed to them. “Absent such a certification, the court
could find that it is unable to draw any reliable inferences from the
allegations” attributed to the CWs,125 or at least substantially discount
such allegations.126 Certification alone would not preclude defendants
from seeking to obtain recanting declarations, but this possibility
could be minimized if plaintiffs’ counsel hire independent counsel for
their CWs. This would preclude direct communication between
defense counsel and the CWs, except in the presence of independent
counsel, and likely reduce both the pressure for CWs to recant and
the threat of retaliation against them.127
Second, Judge Engelmayer suggested that plaintiffs’ counsel
should notify witnesses in advance that they will be identified as CWs
in publicly filed complaints and this designation exposes them to the
risk of identification by name.128 Engelmayer characterized this
suggestion as one reflecting basic decency, rather than one informed
by case law or an ethics canon,129 although elsewhere in his opinion he
stated that “it is a best practice—if not an ethical imperative—for
counsel, before designating a person as a CW in a Complaint, to
notify that person of counsel’s intent to do so.”130 Whether as a best
practice or an ethical requirement, the provision of notice should
become the norm.131 Notice would enable potential witnesses to make
better-informed decisions as to whether to become CWs and
simultaneously reduce the risk of recanting.
38 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 131, 136 (2005) (suggesting that Daou’s addition of a
corroboration requirement was unintended).
125. Coffee, Jr., supra note 46.
126. See Kevin LaCroix, Addressing the Use of Confidential Witnesses in Securities
Litigation, D&O DIARY (Oct. 8, 2017), http://www.dandodiary.com/2017/10/articles
/securities-litigation/addressing-use-confidential-witnesses-securities-litigation/ [perma.cc
/JFB9-VMU9] (suggesting use of substantial discounting in absence of certification).
127. Coffee, Jr., supra note 46.
128. In re Millennial Media, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14 Civ. 7923(PAE), 2015 WL 3443918,
at *13 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015). Accord Lopez v. Ctpartners Exec. Search, Inc., 173 F.
Supp. 3d 12, 31 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
129. In re Millennial Media, 2015 WL 3443918, at *13–14.
130. Id. at *1.
131. See Smollar, supra note 13, at 524 (“Plaintiffs’ attorneys need to make sure to
disclose to the CW that his or her testimony is not confidential.”); Speers, supra note 96, at
7 (“Additionally, plaintiffs’ counsel should ensure that each interviewee is notified of
counsel’s intent to designate him or her as a CW and that such designation may result in
the public disclosure of the witness’s name.”).
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Third, Judge Engelmayer suggested that when an investigator
conducts a witness interview telephonically, either a colleague of the
investigator should join the call or the call should be recorded.132 In
fact, plaintiffs’ investigators in securities fraud litigation do tend to
interview CWs telephonically, taking notes contemporaneously with
the interview, rather than conducting the interviews face-to-face.133
There may be several explanations for this, including expense and
exigency.134 Recording telephonic interviews may not always be an
option, given that some jurisdictions prohibit the taping of telephone
conversations without the consent of all parties to the call,135 but
investigators should seek consent. Where there is no recording, the
investigator should be joined on the call by at least one other
colleague.136 Both recordings and joint calls can help reduce the
incidents of recanting, by corroborating the lead investigator’s
accounts of the witnesses’ statements.
Plaintiffs’ counsel would be wise to comply with Judge
Engelmayer’s suggested procedures. The opinion is the first to set
forth guideposts for conducting acceptable CW interviews and
counsel failing to adhere to this guide run the risk, at least in his
courtroom, of losing motions to permit discovery of CWs before
motions to dismiss are resolved.137 The Southern District of New
132. In re Millennial Media, 2015 WL 3443918, at *6 n.4. This third suggestion echoes
comments made by Judge Rakoff two years earlier in the Lockheed case. See City of
Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that the investigator’s testimony “revealed that his interview
practices were less rigorous than would have been typical of, say, a federal law
enforcement agent; for example, he did not ask any other member of his staff to be with
him on his phone calls with the CWs, nor did he ask the CWs if he could tape-record the
calls or meet with them in-person, preferring to rely, instead, on his non-stenographic
notes of the telephone conversations made even while the conversations were
continuing.”).
133. Smollar, supra note 13, at 504.
134. See id. at 511 (“Investigators must be allowed to talk to these witnesses whenever
and wherever they can.”).
135. See Carol M. Bast, Conflict of Law and Surreptitious Taping of Telephone
Conversations, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 147, 148 (2010) (“Although the federal
government and a majority of states allow surreptitious taping of a telephone conversation
with one-party consent, this practice violates state statutes in ten states.”).
136. See Gregory A. Markel et al., Practice Note, Securities Litigation: Defending
Against Confidential Witness Allegations, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW
http://us.practicallaw.com/w-000-6239?source=relatedcontent
[https://perma.cc/E6FAE2M4 (staff uploaded archive)] (stating that best practices for plaintiffs include (1) having
at least two individuals participate in any interviews of CWs, (2) the investigator or
counsel meeting the CW in person, rather than solely over the phone, and (3) requesting
permission to record the interview).
137. See Davidow et al., supra note 114 (“Following Millennial Media, if plaintiffs’
counsel failed to comply with any of Judge Engelmayer’s procedures in obtaining the
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York, where Judge Engelmayer sits, is the locus of many securities
class action filings. Even if other district court judges fail to expressly
endorse his approach, counsel would be wise to accept it voluntarily.
His suggestions offer the opportunity to minimize the widespread
problem of alleged CW recanting in securities litigation.
Competing proposals to deal with the recantation problem seem
ill-advised. One suggestion, publicly offered by defense counsel for
Millennial Media in the securities litigation, is that Congress should
amend the PSLRA to require plaintiffs, through their counsel, to file
sworn certificates stating they have confirmed the accuracy of any
CW statements used in the complaint and have notified any quoted
individuals that they may be witnesses at trial.138 This is not a radical
suggestion, given that the PSLRA already requires plaintiffs to file
sworn certifications stating, inter alia, that they have reviewed the
complaint, authorized its filing, and are willing to act as
representative plaintiffs.139 But it does seem designed primarily to
chill the willingness of CWs to assist plaintiffs and their counsel.
Requiring notice to CWs that they may be trial witnesses seems like
an intimidation tactic, especially since so few securities class actions
actually do proceed to trial.
A second proposal, also from the defense bar, is that courts
should require complaints in securities cases to include factual
allegations about the experience and reliability of the investigators
that plaintiffs use, or about the pre-filing investigation itself.140 This
requirement appears both unnecessary and unduly burdensome. It is
unclear what kind of allegations would suffice as to the reliability of a
plaintiff’s investigator, and mandating that a complaint include a
detailed description of plaintiff’s pre-filing investigation risks the
forced disclosure of attorney work product.
A third proposal, again from the defense bar, is that plaintiffs’
counsel “be required to obtain from each [CW] a declaration and/or a
certification that he or she has read the complaint and agrees with the

confidential witness statement, a court may be more likely to grant a motion for discovery
into the confidential witness allegations pre-motion to dismiss, or at least to be sensitive to
these issues in considering a motion to dismiss.”).
138. See Lyle Roberts, Time for Securities Lawyers to Stand Behind Their ‘Confidential
Witnesses,’ FORBES (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2016/08/19
/time-for-securities-lawyers-to-stand-behind-their-confidential-witnesses/#e3a9205a6e04
[https://perma.cc/7THM-34L6] (“It is time for Congress to close the ‘confidential witness’
loophole.”).
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A) (2012).
140. See Loewenson & Beha II, supra note 90.
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description of the information he or she provided.”141 According to
one proponent of this requirement, it “would prevent most CW
problems, and make the ones that do arise much easier to resolve.”142
While it may be true that many CWs with accurate information to
offer would want to provide a certification to avoid the disruption
that can result if a complaint fails to accurately reflect the witness’
account,143 there could be a chilling effect on many other witnesses
who are reluctant to sign formal documents under oath.144 Moreover,
the proposal creates logistical complications. Requiring plaintiffs’
initial case filings to include sworn declarations from the CWs
referenced in the complaint “defeats the purpose of having
‘confidential’ witnesses.”145 If the certifications are to be filed
contemporaneously with the filing of the complaint, they would have
to be filed under seal and made inaccessible to defendants in order to
preserve the CWs’ anonymity at the pleading stage of litigation.
Otherwise, defendants could unmask CWs simply by accessing their
signed declarations, which would elevate the substantial risk of
retaliation.
Other problems would arise where a CW is identified by
defendants who submit a recanting declaration during the pendency
of a motion to dismiss or a motion for reconsideration following
denial of a motion to dismiss. Submission of a recanting declaration,
followed by unsealing of the CW’s certification, would require the
court to (1) improperly consider extrinsic evidence, (2) make an
improper credibility determination, and (3) permit a violation of the
PSLRA’s stay of discovery and other proceedings. First, it is well
established that in general courts are barred from considering
extrinsic evidence when deciding motions to dismiss.146 Recanting
declarations should be encompassed by this prohibition.147 Second,

141. Greene, supra note 101.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Smollar, supra note 11, at 4 (“[A]ny requirement that former employees sign a
formal legal document, especially under oath, would have a chilling effect on their
willingness to reveal what they know.”).
145. Smollar, supra note 13, at 510.
146. See FED. R. CIV P. 12(b); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (“As a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion to
dismiss may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.”); Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (“To decide a
motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.”).
147. See Eisenkraft, supra note 123 (“[R]ecantation affidavits from confidential
witnesses are no different than any other extrinsic evidence and cannot be considered on a
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whether a recanting CW did make statements attributed to him in a
complaint is essentially a credibility question,148 and a motion to
dismiss is not the proper vehicle to test the credibility of witnesses.
The Supreme Court has been clear that credibility assessments are
within the purview of the ultimate trier of fact.149 Accordingly, courts
should decline to consider affidavits or declarations from recanting
CWs when deciding motions to dismiss or motions to reconsider
denials of motions to dismiss. Third, as noted previously, the PSLRA
requires that “all discovery and other proceedings” be stayed pending
any motion to dismiss150 and courts have tended to interpret this
provision broadly. As such, the submission of a declaration from a
recanting CW during the pendency of a motion to dismiss may
constitute discovery or other proceedings, and thus fall within the
ambit of the PSLRA’s stay. Several courts have so held.151 Other
motion to dismiss when every allegation must be taken as true.”). Less clear-cut are
motions for reconsideration following the denial of motions to dismiss. In securities
litigation, where the PSLRA establishes a high scienter pleading standard, some courts
will consider extrinsic evidence—including CW recanting declarations—on motions for
reconsideration if a manifest factual error was made by the court when deciding the initial
motion to dismiss. This may be limited to situations where the error was based on fraud by
the plaintiff, carelessness by plaintiff’s counsel in making its factual allegations, or by the
court’s own misperception of the facts. See Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks,
Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1220–24 (N.D. Ga. 2012); see also City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret.
Sys. v. Boeing Co., 711 F.3d 754, 759–60, 761 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of action
following successful motion for reconsideration that included deposition testimony from
CW that he had no personal knowledge of facts attributed to him in complaint); John D.
Pernick & Ryan D. Nassau, Testing and Attacking Confidential Witness Allegations at an
Early Stage, AM. BAR ASS’N SEC. LITIG. COMM. (Mar. 20, 2014),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/securities/articles/winter2014-0314-testingattacking-confidential-witness-allegations-at-an-early-stage.html
[https://perma.cc/7S8SEXMH] (“For the most part, courts are reluctant to consider disputes regarding the
accuracy of CW allegations in the context of a motion to dismiss, although they seem to be
more receptive to such evidence in the context of a motion for reconsideration.”).
148. See In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1312 (S.D.
Fla. 2011) (“Whether the confidential witnesses initially made the statements attributed to
them in the complaints is essentially a credibility question.”); Wu Group v. Synopsis, Inc.,
No. C 04-3580 MJJ, 2005 WL 1926626, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2005) (“[W]hether the
[CW] statements were made is essentially a credibility question.”).
149. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328 (2007)
(stating that it is “within the jury’s authority to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve
any genuine issues of fact, and make the ultimate determination whether [defendants]
acted with scienter”).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012).
151. See, e.g., In re ProQuest Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 728, 740 (E.D. Mich. 2007)
(concluding that by seeking and obtaining a declaration from a CW during the pendency
of a motion to dismiss, defendant ProQuest “engaged in discovery which was wholly
improper”). In Union Asset Management. Holding AG v. SanDisk LLC, 227 F. Supp. 3d
1098 (N.D. Cal. 2017), defendant SanDisk tried to finesse the issue by submitting a
recanting declaration ostensibly to support its request to deny leave to amend, rather than
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courts have held that the PSLRA’s automatic stay does not
encompass investigatory interviews conducted during the pendency of
a motion to dismiss,152 but those cases can be distinguished, at least in
part because they did not involve submission to the court of recanting
affidavits.153 They merely involved interviews of prospective
witnesses.154 Overall, the proposal that plaintiffs’ counsel be required
to obtain from each of their CWs a declaration and/or a certification
that he has read the complaint and agrees with the description of the
information he has provided seems unwise.
Some of the reasons set forth above also undermine yet another
approach to the problem of recanting witnesses—permitting their
depositions during the pendency of motions to dismiss. This approach
has been endorsed in dicta by the Second Circuit, in Campo v. Sears
Holding Corp.155 Many defense lawyers expected and hoped that
Campo would initiate a trend.156 It did not,157 and that is appropriate,
because Campo’s dicta missed the mark. Post-Campo, those courts
considering the issue have rejected attempts to depose CWs prior to
resolving motions to dismiss, in part because the PSLRA’s automatic
discovery stay prohibits the taking of such depositions during the

in direct support of its motion to dismiss. Id. at 1099. The district court properly rejected
this end-run, by granting plaintiff’s motion to strike the recanting declaration and denying
SanDisk’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 1099–1101. Other courts have disagreed, and relied on
recanting declarations to dismiss securities cases with prejudice, following reconsideration
of the denial of motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks,
Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d, 1210, 1220–21 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (CW submits multiple declarations
contradicting statements attributed to him in amended complaint and denying having ever
made such statements to plaintiffs’ investigators).
152. See, e.g., In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1134 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (holding that plaintiff’s proposed interviews with former employees were not
within the scope of discovery because “[n]either the former employees nor the defendants
[were] required to participate in these interviews in any way”); In re Tyco Int’l Ltd. Sec.
Litig., No.00-MD-1335-B, 2001 WL 34075721, at *2–3 (D.N.H. Jan. 30, 2001) (holding that
a voluntary interview of Tyco’s former employee was not within the scope of discovery
because “[t]here is not the slightest hint in the congressional record that the discovery stay
was intended to apply to either parties’ own investigation”).
153. See JDS Uniphase, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1133–34; Tyco, 2001 WL 34075721, at *2–3.
154. See JDS Uniphase, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1133–34; Tyco, 2001 WL 34075721, at *2–3.
155. 371 F. App’x 212, at 216 n.4 (2d Cir. 2010).
156. See Bryan B. House, The Fact Pattern Behind the Boeing Class Action Grounding,
LAW360 (Apr. 2, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/429130/the-fact-patternbehind-the-boeing-class-action-grounding [https://perma.cc/78FL-7AMT]; see also Joseph
C. Weinstein & Joseph P. Rodgers, Unmasking Confidential Witnesses?, LAW360 (June 23,
2010,
11:59
AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/172877/unmasking-confidentialwitnesses [https://perma.cc/GU3F-KB4R (staff uploaded archive)] (“Many securities
litigators believe Campo is a step in the right direction.”).
157. See Pernick & Nassau, supra note 147 (“Other courts have been reluctant to
follow Campo.”).
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pendency of motions to dismiss.158 Campo’s approach also violates
Rule 12(b), which generally prohibits consideration of material
beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.159
In summary, recanting CWs are a significant recurring problem
in securities litigation, even though the incidence of genuine recanting
has been overstated. The root of the recanting problem can be traced
to the manner in which these individuals are interviewed pre-filing by
plaintiffs and their investigators. Judge Engelmayer set forth some
best practices for handling such interviews, and they appear to be
both practical and preferable to the competing proposals most often
publicized by defense counsel.160
IV. DISCOVERABILITY OF CW INTERVIEW NOTES
A third contentious aspect of CW interviews by plaintiffs’
counsel and/or investigators is whether notes of those interviews are
discoverable. Defendants may seek discovery of interview notes for
multiple reasons, both disclosed and undisclosed. The reasons may
include the opportunity to discover evidence that impeaches the CWs
or evidence that tends to reveal plaintiff’s litigation strategy. As
discussed below, plaintiffs generally resist discovery, often by
claiming work product protection.
The discoverability issue has numerous prongs. The first is
whether interview notes enjoy work product protection. As to this,
“[c]ourts have consistently held that notes and memoranda . . . with
respect to a witness interview ‘are opinion work product entitled to

158. See, e.g., Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 1210,
1217 n.6 (N.D. Ga. 2012); In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Sec. Litig., 836 F. Supp. 2d 878, 912 n.15
(D. Minn. 2011); In re Cell Therapeutics, Inc. No. C10-414MJP, 2010 WL 4791808, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 2010).
159. In re Cell Therapeutics, 2010 WL 4791808, at *2 (“The only permissible way under
the FRCP’s [sic] to consider extrinsic evidence such as Defendants propose is to convert
Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.”). Cf. In re St.
Jude Medical Inc. Sec. Litig., 836 F. Supp. 2d at 901 n.9 (expressing doubt about the
propriety of addressing factual accuracy of an affidavit submitted by a CW in connection
with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
160. Judge Engelmayer’s recommended best practices may be gaining traction. In July
2017, the Duke Law Center for Judicial Studies sponsored a conference on “Emerging
Issues in Securities Class Actions” that was limited to invited federal judges and
prominent securities lawyers. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 46; Emerging Issues in Securities
Class Actions, DUKE LAW, https://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/conferences/july2017/
[https://perma.cc/Z926-GZC7]. The purpose of the conference was to lay the groundwork
for the adoption of bench-bar best practices in six aspects of securities litigation, the first
of which was the use of confidential witnesses. Id.
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almost absolute immunity.’”161 This is true whether or not the witness
is an employee of the defendant.162 Defendants sometimes try to
undercut this consistent holding by arguing that they seek the
production of interview notes reflecting facts learned by plaintiffs
during CW interviews, and neither the attorney-client privilege nor
the work product doctrine protects underlying facts.163 But this
argument should generally fail, because it is rarely feasible to separate
the purely factual components of interview notes from that portion
reflecting the attorneys’ mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories.164
A separate but related prong is whether notes of interviews
conducted by plaintiffs’ investigators enjoy the same degree of
protection extended to notes of interviews conducted by plaintiffs’
counsel. The issue is important because, as noted, CW interviews are
frequently conducted by investigators. This phenomenon is not
unique to class action securities litigation. Attorneys often must rely
on the assistance of investigators and other agents during litigation in
a broad spectrum of subject areas. Courts have recognized this
necessity and have held that the work product doctrine protects both
materials prepared by agents for the attorneys and those prepared by
the attorney for himself.165 Agents whose materials prepared in

161. Murphy v. Kmart Corp., 259 F.R.D. 421, 428 (D.S.D. 2009) (quoting Baker v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 209 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (noting that work product may include facts and theories reflected in
interviews); Buck v. Indian Mountain Sch., No. 15 CV 123 (JBA), 2017 WL 421648, at *3
(D. Conn. Jan. 31, 2017) (finding that the attorney’s “notes of witness interviews, which
include his mental impressions and thought processes, are protected work-product”).
162. See Michaelbrent Collings, Discoverability of Attorney Interview Notes, L.A. LAW.
Dec. 2006, at 12, https://www.lacba.org/docs/default-source/lal-back-issues/2006-issues
/december-2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWP9-7VLJ] (“[T]he standing or status of a witness
does not seem to matter in the determination of whether attorney notes are
discoverable.”).
163. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 4373(SAS)(JLC), 2010 WL
2720015, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2010).
164. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B); see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399
(1981) (“Forcing an attorney to disclose notes and memoranda of witnesses’ oral
statements is particularly disfavored because it tends to reveal the attorney’s mental
processes”); SEC v. NIR Grp., LLC, 283 F.R.D. 127, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (denying
motion to compel disclosure of witness interview notes, because attorney’s mental
impressions in notes “cannot be adequately extricated from the facts”).
165. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 58, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238–39 (1975)). Accord NIR Grp., LLC, 283 F.R.D. at 134
(“The work product privilege protects documents produced by staff working at an
attorney’s direction, in addition to those prepared by the attorney herself.”).
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anticipation of litigation are protected by the work product doctrine
include investigators.166
A third prong concerns the requisite showing by defendants to
overcome the work product protection extended to CW interview
notes created by plaintiffs’ counsel and investigators. Work product
may be subject to disclosure upon an adverse party’s demonstration
of substantial need for the materials and undue hardship in obtaining
the substantial equivalent.167 Defendants in class action securities
litigation sometimes argue that they have substantial need for CW
interview notes to confirm the veracity of certain allegations set forth
in the complaint, or because CWs allegedly have recanted certain
allegations attributed to them.168 This argument should fail in most
cases, insofar as CWs typically can be deposed once the PSLRA
discovery stay is lifted and their availability for deposition
undermines a claim of substantial need for work product material. As
noted by one federal district court, “the party seeking discovery can
ask the witness himself about the events in issue, and, if the witness
recalls the events in issue, the need for notes or other materials
prepared by opposing counsel is, thereby, eliminated.”169 Moreover,
as noted, defendants’ claims that CWs have recanted, or that the
allegations attributed in complaints to the CWs are inaccurate, often
are meritless. A recent example is In re Barrick Gold Securities

166. Constabile v. Cty. of Westchester, 254 F.R.D. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Agents
include those who are enlisted by legal counsel to perform investigative or analytical tasks
to aid counsel in preparing for litigation.”) (citing Kayata v. Foote, Cone & Belding
Worldwide, L.L.C., No. 99 CIV. 9022 VM KNF, 2000 WL 502859, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26,
2000)).
167. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii); see FTC v. Staples, Inc., Civ. Action No. 15-2115
(EGS), 2016 WL 259642, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2016) (“‘[U]ndue hardship’ is generally
found only in extreme circumstances such as unavailability due to death, brain injury or
where a witness’s geographic location is beyond the court’s subpoena power.”) (citing
EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 927–32 (5th ed. 2007)).
168. See, e.g., In re Barrick Gold Sec. Litig., No. 13-cv-3851 (SAS), 2016 WL 1459674,
at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2016).
169. A.I.A. Holdings, S.A. v. Lehman Bros., Inc., No. 97 Civ. 4978(LMM)(HB), 2002
WL 31385824, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2002); see also Staples, Inc., 2016 WL 259642, at *3–
5 (denying motion to compel production of witness interview notes, because defendants
could “interview or depose as many of the third parties that were interviewed or deposed
by the Plaintiffs as desired”); SEC v. Neil, No. C 14-00122 WHA, 2014 WL 2931096, at *1,
5 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2014) (denying defendant’s request to compel production of raw
notes and memoranda from SEC’s informal interviews with voluntary witnesses); SEC v.
Stanard, No. 06 Civ. 7736 (GEL), 2007 WL 1834709, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2007)
(rejecting claim of substantial need for interview notes because “[d]efendants are free to
question each of the witnesses at their depositions, and at trial”).
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Litigation.170 In that case, decided in 2016, the federal district judge
denied defendants’ motion to compel the production of CW interview
notes created by plaintiffs’ investigator after conducting an in camera
inspection of the notes and determining that the amended complaint’s
attributions to the CWs accurately reflected the contents of the
notes.171 Overall, in most securities cases, courts should reject
defendants’ efforts to overcome work product protection by showing
substantial need for CW interview notes created by plaintiffs’ counsel
and investigators.
A fourth prong concerns whether plaintiffs waive the protection
of the work product doctrine by selectively using CW interview notes
as both a shield and a sword. It is well established that waiver can
occur where a party makes “deliberate, affirmative, and selective use
of work product” materials,172 and the use of such materials as both a
shield and a sword can result in waiver.173 Here, the argument by
defendants may be that if a CW allegedly recants, either before or
during his deposition, and plaintiffs’ counsel then seeks to impeach
the CW’s deposition testimony by using the investigator’s interview
notes, this constitutes selective use of the notes as both a shield and a
sword. This argument should fail, at least where the impeachment
effort is limited to questioning the CW about the substance of his
conversations with the investigator, rather than questioning the
witness about the interview notes.174 If the CW is not questioned
about the notes, there is no proscribed use of them as both a shield
and a sword.
A fifth prong is whether the work product doctrine protects the
identities of those persons interviewed by an attorney or his agent in
anticipation of litigation. While this has been described as an
unsettled question,175 the better-reasoned decisions distinguish
170. No. 13-cv-3851 (SAS), 2016 WL 1459674 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2016).
171. Id. at *1, *3.
172. SEC v. Gupta, 281 F.R.D. 169, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
173. See Seneca Ins. Co. v. Western Claims, Inc., 774 F.3d 1272, 1278 (10th Cir. 2014)
(“[A] litigant cannot use the work product doctrine as both a sword and shield by
selectively using the privileged documents to prove a point but then invok[e] the privilege
to prevent an opponent from challenging the assertion.” (quoting Frontier Ref., Inc. v.
Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 704 (10th Cir. 1998))); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No.
11 Civ. 0691 (LAK) (JCF), 2013 WL 4045326, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2013) (applying the
sword-shield doctrine and ordering production of documents).
174. See Constabile v. Cty. of Westchester, 254 F.R.D. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(finding no proscribed use by plaintiffs of investigator’s report as both shield and sword,
and therefore no waiver of work product protection).
175. See US Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. PHL Variable Ins. Co., Nos. 12 Civ. 6811(CM)(JCF),
13 Civ. 1580(CM)(JCF), 2013 WL 5495542, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2013).
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between discovery requests seeking an identification of persons
knowledgeable about the adverse party’s claim or defenses from
those seeking an identification of persons who have been contacted or
interviewed by counsel concerning the case. The former requests are
permissible, while the latter are not. They are impermissible because
such requests seek to disclose the mental processes and strategic
assessments of counsel.176 A sub-issue arises from a situation in which
plaintiffs rely on a particular CW in an early iteration of their filed
complaint, but remove references to that individual in a subsequent
version of the complaint. If defendants seek disclosure of that CW’s
identity, is that tantamount to seeking identification of persons who
have been interviewed by counsel and therefore impermissible? At
least one court has addressed this issue and concluded that the
defendants’ request did not seek work product, because defendants
merely sought the identity of a CW who plaintiffs identified in their
initial complaint as someone with knowledge of their claims.177 It is
not clear that this perspective is correct. All CWs in securities cases
will have been interviewed by plaintiffs’ counsel or their investigators,
so a discovery request seeking the identification of a CW included in
an original complaint but then omitted from an amended complaint
arguably does seek the identification of a witness interviewed by
counsel or her agent.
Overall, the discoverability of notes taken by plaintiffs’ counsel
and/or investigators during the course of interviewing CWs pre-filing
is another thorny issue in securities litigation. Defendants may seek
these notes to discover impeachment material, or perhaps to covertly
discover plaintiffs’ litigation strategy. Whatever the motive, such
notes should be protected from disclosure in most cases by the
attorney work-product doctrine, whether the interview was conducted
by counsel or investigators retained by counsel on behalf of plaintiffs.

176. See, e.g., Hamilton v. RadioShack Corp., No. C 11-00888 LB, 2012 WL 2327191, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2012) (denying motion to compel disclosure of witnesses who were
interviewed by opposing counsel because disclosure would involve protected work
product); Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., No. C01-20418,
2005 WL 1459555, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2005) (identifying names of investigatory
interviewees “would allow Defendants to infer the importance of these witnesses,
revealing Plaintiff’s legal theories and conclusion[s]”); In re MTI Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig. II,
No. SACV 00-0745 DOC, 2002 WL 32344347, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2002) (“[T]he
identity of witnesses interviewed by opposing counsel is protected . . . . [I]f the identity of
interviewed witnesses is disclosed, opposing counsel can infer which witnesses counsel
considers important, revealing mental impressions and trial strategy.”).
177. See Hatamian v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 14-cv-00226-YGR (JSC),
2015 WL 5604392, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2015).
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CONCLUSION
CWs play an essential role in securities class action litigation, as
an unintended consequence of the PSLRA. The use of CWs by
plaintiffs has generated a series of vexing issues. One set of issues
concerns the use by companies of confidentiality, separation, and
severance agreements to preclude or chill the opportunity for
employees or former employees to be interviewed by plaintiffs’
counsel or investigators during the pre-filing phase of litigation.
Courts should generally refuse to enforce these agreements on public
policy grounds and consistent with the recent approach taken by the
SEC under Rule 21F-17. A second set of issues concerns CWs who
recant or are alleged to have recanted. Recanting is less common than
defendants often assert and much of the recanting that does occur is
the result of pressure exerted by defendants. Still, some recanting is
genuine. Recanting likely could be minimized if plaintiffs’ counsel
and investigators followed prudent guidance concerning CW
interviews provided by Judge Engelmayer in a decision he issued in
2015. Finally, the use of CWs raises a spectrum of issues concerning
the discoverability of notes of CW interviews. In most situations those
notes should be protected from discovery by the work product
doctrine, whether the interview was conducted by counsel or
counsel’s investigator. Courts generally should reject defendants’
efforts to overcome work product protection by arguing substantial
need. Proscribed use by plaintiffs of the notes as both a shield and a
sword can be avoided by careful counsel. Finally, the identities of
those CWs who are interviewed by plaintiffs’ counsel or investigators
should be protected by the work product doctrine.
Notwithstanding the numerous problems created by the
widespread reliance by plaintiffs on CWs in securities litigation,
courts should not take steps that would significantly restrict their use.
Given the obstacles imposed by the PSLRA, the opportunity to use
CWs often represents the only viable opportunity for plaintiffs to
survive a motion to dismiss. If this opportunity disappears, then
private securities litigation may go with it. And that would be a
tremendous disservice to the investing public. Plaintiffs’ lawyers no
doubt have abused their use of CWs in multiple cases, but that
abuse—exaggerated by defendants—does not justify some of the
drastic remedial measures suggested by the defense bar. Alternative
moderate steps are much more appropriate.

